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The New MMPA Standard: One Step 
Forward or Two Steps Back? 
Jacob Adamson* 
ABSTRACT 
In the summer of 2020, Missouri legislators passed a law that drastically reduced 
consumer protections in Missouri.1 SB-591 amended – and effectively gutted – the 
protections of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA). The MMPA 
was the primary method of relief for Missouri consumers who have fallen victim to 
fraudulent behavior. The freshly gutted MMPA has distinct parallels to the inade-
quacies of common law fraud. Wronged consumers now face higher burdens of 
proof, minimal awards, and an uphill battle to seek redress when they have been 
wronged. This article examines the law’s progression from inadequate remedies 
under common law fraud to the new version of Missouri’s consumer protection re-
gime. Under the new version of Missouri’s consumer protection law, Missouri con-
sumers now face similar inadequacies during a time when merchants are more so-
phisticated than ever. This article further speculates on the impacts SB-591 may 
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(2020)). 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 
The most recent amendment to Missouri’s consumer protection statute, the 
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, is a regression to the limited protections of 
common law fraud.2 The most recent amendment removes guarantees of redress 
stemming from punitive damages and a “broad” consumer protection statute.3 Con-
sumers can  now expect merchants to continue with the psychological manipulation 
that has been going on for decades.4 Consumers can expect some merchant behavior 
to go unchecked because their damages are not ascertainable.5 Even when consum-
ers feel sufficiently deceived to bring suit, inadequate damage awards may render 
litigation a risky and unrewarding venture.6 
A. History of Consumer Protections 
Before the development of consumer protection in the 20th century, consumers 
could only bring actions against merchants through the tort deceit.7 This tort action 
eventually evolved to include breach of contract or warranties in the sale of goods.8 
As merchants became increasingly sophisticated, common law fraud needed to 
adapt for consumers to achieve a successful action.9 Prior to the adoption of con-
sumer protections, proving the elements necessary for relief under common law 
fraud presented hurdles for consumers.10 Furthermore, small damages awards 
hardly made the effort of bringing a claim worthwhile.11 As a result of the need for 
increased consumer protections, states began enacting Consumer Protection Acts 
based on the Federal Trade Commission Act.12 
B. From Common Law Origins to Modern Consumer Pro-
tection 
Common law fraud traditionally governed transactions within the market-
place.13 Common law fraud rested on notions of “caveat emptor”, or “buyer beware” 
 
 2. See id. 
 3. See James Copland & Rafael Mangual, Keep reforming Missouri lawsuit abuse in 2018, 
SPRINGFIELD NEWSLEADER, (Feb. 2, 2018 11:20 AM), https://www.news-leader.com/story/opin-
ion/readers/2018/02/02/keep-reforming-missouri-lawsuit-abuse-2018/1087167001/. 
 4. See Philip A. Hart, A Shield For The Shopper – Truth In Packaging Legislation Needed, 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 12349, 12349 (July 10, 1963), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-
CRECB-1963-pt9/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1963-pt9-12.pdf. 
 5. See Missouri Aims to Weed out Meritless Punitive Damage Claims and Reign in Consumer Pro-
tection Claims, LATHROP GAGE (May 22, 2020), https://www.lathropgpm.com/newsletter-72561.html. 
 6. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection 
Acts, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1, at 7 (2006). 
 7. Id. at 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 7. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 61; Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little FTC 
Acts”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 374 (1990). 
 12. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 3. 
 13. See e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 AM. L. 
REG. 337, 338 (1905); Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 
1138 (1931). 
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and “ordinary care and attention,” in that buyers held a duty to inspect the quality 
of goods during transactions.14 Under the common law, the presumption was that 
buyers would only want to purchase goods from merchants who were honest and 
fair.15 Conversely, it was presumed that sellers would be motivated to be honest and 
fair in order to attract buyers.16 The remedy for fraud eventually developed, leading 
to contractual ideologies of fair dealing.17 If merchants could not be trusted to deal 
fairly on their own, “the law ought to exact of men at least common honesty in their 
dealings with each other”.18 
When aggrieved consumers brought an action under common law fraud, they 
needed to prove nine elements: 
(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker’s 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, (5) his intent that it should be acted 
on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer’s igno-
rance of its falsity, (7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his right to rely thereon, and (9) 
his consequence and proximate injury.19 
Common law fraud, and its remedy,20 proved to be ineffective as merchants 
became increasingly sophisticated.21 Under the common law, consumers could not 
bring suit without having already suffered damages.22 In turn, consumers and attor-
neys could not combat misrepresentations unless they had already become a victim 
of such falsehoods.23  Furthermore, the elements of the “merchant intending to de-
ceive” and the consumer “justifiably relying on those deceptions” were “notoriously 
difficult and expensive” to prove.24 
The difficulties inherent with this approach demonstrated the common law was 
inadequate to combat the fraudulent behavior of modern merchants.25 These diffi-
culties led Congress to establish the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in 1914.26 
The primary objective of the FTC was, initially, to combat antitrust violations.27 
The enactment of the FTC in 1914 did not grant governmental protection to con-
sumers, nor did it grant a private right of action under the act.28 At the time, some 
Members of Congress believed citizens who were deceived by merchants could 
successfully bring worthwhile actions under common law.29 This was hardly the 
case, due to the nature of bringing an action and the relief available under the 
 
 14. See Hamilton, supra note 13; Joanna Shepard, The Expanding Missouri Merchandising Prac-
tices Act, ATR FOUNDATION 3, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/02/103114_MMPAreport.pdf; McAdams v. Cates, 24 Mo. 223, 225 (Mo. 1857). 
 15. See Shepard, supra note 14. 
 16. Id. 
 17. McAdams, 24 Mo. at 226. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See e.g. Black v. Rite Mortgage and Financial, Inc., 239 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 
2007); Jennings v. SSM Health Care St. Louis, 355 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2011). 
 20. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 7. 
 21. See Shepard, supra note 14. 
 22. See id. at 6. 
 23. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 6. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.; Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 720-721 (1914) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914)). 
 28. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 13. 
 29. Id. at 14. 
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common law.30 Congress granted the FTC consumer protection powers in 1938.31 
Congress, however, did not grant a private right of action to consumers under the 
act which created the FTC. 32 As a result, states began enacting their own consumer 
protection laws.33 
C. State Consumer Protection 
Upon suggestions by the FTC, many states began enacting consumer protection 
acts in the 1960’s and 1970’s.34 Despite variance in state law, the thrust of these 
consumer protection laws was to counter unfair or deceptive merchant practices.35 
Most state consumer protection laws gave consumers a right to bring lawsuits with-
out exhausting administrative remedies.36 State consumer protection laws varied as 
to the elements of proof necessary to bring an action as well as the prohibited acts37. 
Most states did not require proof of reliance as an element.38 Some of these 
states required that the reliance be reasonable or justifiable. 39 Other states followed 
a standard mirroring the FTC Act: “whether the act has the tendency or capacity to 
mislead consumers, regardless of whether the plaintiff actually and reasonably re-
lied on the misrepresentation.”40 
In recent years, states have broadened or restricted consumer protections.41 In 
2018, Maryland amended its consumer protection statute to include more claims 
under the purview of consumer protection.42 The statute now prohibits “unfair, abu-
sive, or deceptive trade practices.”43 Conversely, Arkansas has restricted consum-
ers’ ability to bring an action.44 The prior Arkansas statute allowed consumers to 
bring an action for suffering actual damage or injury as a result of the consumer 
protection statute.45 The amended statute requires claimants to suffer “an actual fi-
nancial loss as a result of his or reliance on the use of a practice declared unlaw-
ful.”46 The claimant’s recovery is limited to “his or her actual financial loss proxi-
mately caused by the offense or violation.”47 As a result, Arkansas consumers can 
 
 30. See id. at 13. 
 31. Id. at 8. 
 32. Id. at 14-15. 
 33. Id. at 15. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See generally id. at 16 (granting a private right of action meant consumers no longer had to rely 
on administrative remedies). 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id at 18. 
 40. Id. at 19. 
 41. See Allen Denson & Latif Zaman, State’s Divergent Approaches to Unfair, Deveptive, and Abu-
sive Acts and Practices Reveal Cosnumer Protection Priorities, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Aug. 22, 
2019) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2019/09/abusive-acts/. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (indicating an actual financial loss as a result of his or reliance on the use of a practice declared 
unlawful). 
 47. Id. 
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only bring an action when they suffer “financial losses,” and a consumer’s damages 
must stem from “reliance” on the unlawful practice.48 
The rationale behind some states’ initial departure from common law fraud 
may also explain Arkansas’s amended statute. Arkansas consumers can no longer 
be proactive in holding businesses accountable prior to loss. Instead, they are only 
able to bring an action after suffering such loss.49 Issues may stem from the reactive 
nature of the statue, in that consumers may be reluctant to bring an action when they 
have suffered minimal monetary damages.50 
Some states allow statutory remedies when a consumer’s damages are insuffi-
cient to justify bringing an action, taking into account expenses such as attorney’s 
fees.51 Again, there is variance between states.52 States vary in the available reme-
dies, in that some states may allow for emotional distress damages, double damages, 
treble damages, increased awards, attorney’s fees or punitive damages.53 An award 
for attorney’s fees serves as a prominent method states use to curtail bad business 
practices.54 Awarding attorney’s fees grants clearly wronged consumers an oppor-
tunity to bring their case, even when they suffer minimal damages.55 Although 
awarding attorney’s fees in the statute would encourage consumers to bring claims 
when they are clearly wronged, if the suit is not accompanied by other sufficient 
damages, then many consumers would be reluctant to file suit when the damages 
are nominal. Attorney’s fees are one method to punish bad actors, yet without more 
incentive for the consumer to bring suit, merchants are not fully discouraged from 
acting in bad faith.56 
An alternative solution for aggrieved consumers with minimal losses is a class 
action lawsuit. The ability to bring a class action lawsuit under state consumer pro-
tection statutes differs from state to state.57 Plaintiffs may prefer a class action law-
suit because it may show the court that a significant number of people were harmed 
by the action, while also allowing for plaintiffs to split attorney’s fees.58 Some states 
prohibit class actions under their consumer protection statute while others remain 
silent on the issue.59 Of the states that do allow class actions, some limit the amount 
a plaintiff can recover.60 
D. “Abuse” Of Consumer Protection Acts 
There is no doubt that as consumer protections have increased, litigation on the 
subject has also increased.61 This spike in litigation has caused legislators to 
 
 48. See infra part II (actual financial losses are often difficult to ascertain due to the nature of con-
sumerism). 
 49. Denson, supra note 41. 
 50. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 13. 
 51. See id. at 26. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 22-25 
 54. Id. at 26. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 8. 
 57. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 28-29. 
 58. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 8. 
 59. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 29. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 13. 
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question whether consumer protections actually cause more harm than good.62 
“Frivolous” consumer protection litigation has been a topic of discussion for 
years.63 Opponents of consumer protection argue that an increase in state consumer 
litigation leads to increased consumer costs as businesses raise prices on products 
to cover these increased litigation costs.64 However, these theories are based on the 
speculative complexities of consumer pricing.65 Similarly, the social value of con-
sumer protection statutes is in controversy due to the speculative nature of the ben-
efits derived from these statutes.66 The concepts of consumer pricing and social val-
ues are often quite complicated and cannot be firmly established.67 Basic theories 
of economics tend to state that supply and demand govern consumer pricing. 68 Ul-
timately, the complexities governing corporate pricing clearly incorporate a wide 
variety of factors into establishing the cost of products, with litigation being one of 
those considerations.69 
Missouri has recently seen notorious class action lawsuits under the state’s con-
sumer protection act.70 The American Tort Reform Society has dubbed Missouri as 
a “Judicial Hellhole,” and commentators have called Missouri the “Sue Me State.”71 
More than 60% of the class actions against Johnson & Johnson alleging cancer-
causing baby powder were filed in Missouri.72 This illustrates how varied consumer 
protection laws lead to forum shopping. A 2017 survey of corporate executives and 
their attorneys ranked Missouri as one of the highest liability litigation states.73 This 
is purported to make it difficult for corporations to justify expanding operations and 
creating jobs within the state.74 
The extent of consumer litigation has reached astonishing levels. A 2009 study 
found that the number of state consumer protection judicial decisions rose 119% 
from 2000 to 2007.75 In terms of all cases filed, consumer litigation substantially 
exceeded all other categories of actions.76 Missouri, the “Sue Me State,” saw a 
678% increase in judicial decisions from 2000 to 2009 under the Merchandising 
Practices Act.77 Missouri saw the fourth-highest growth in consumer protection 
lawsuits from 2000 to 2009.78 This number, however, does not tell the entire story. 
 
 62. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 33; Stefon David, Can I Sue for That, BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
& TAX L. REV., https://mulaw.missouri.edu/betr/2019/04/12/can-sue-overstretched-missouri-merchan-
dising-practices-act/ (last visited April 17, 2021); Shepard, supra note 14, at 15-16. 
 63. Copland, supra note 3. 
 64. See generally id. (indicating that lax evidentiary standards have led to increased class actions law-
suits in Missouri). 
 65. See generally Bill Merrilees & Nigel Cotman, An Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection 
Law, 48-1 AUSTRALIAN Q. 79, 82-83 (1976) (explaining several models used to determine loss); E. Glen 
Weyl, What Is “Price Theory”?, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (July 29, 2015 7:38 AM) https://marginalrev-
olution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/07/what-is-price-theory.htm (describing the complexities in 
properly defining price theory). 
 66. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 27. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Weyl, supra note 65. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Copland, supra note 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 13. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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Because these are judicial decisions, the above data do not fully represent cases 
which are filed or settled.79 
Some consumer protection litigation is likely frivolous.80 Examples include 
lawsuits over a box of candy.81 While it is not likely congress’s intention to protect 
consumers on every aspect of a transaction, the basic concepts behind the consumer 
protection lawsuits shed light onto a myriad of deceitful and confusing tactics em-
ployed by merchants. One can probably imagine this news headline: “Jury awards 
$50,000 in damages for half box of candy.” These “shock headlines” beget outrage 
and draw attention to matters that some consumers may consider frivolous.82 Ex-
cessive outrage leads to nationwide opinions on our judicial system that may not 
necessarily be conceptually sound.83 For example, a 2016 study conducted by the 
Wall Street Journal found that 87% of voters believed there were “too many law-
suits filed in America.”84 These negative impressions tend to paint a picture that 
there are too many frivolous lawsuits and unsound jury awards,85 thereby causing 
consumer prices to increase.  The underlying merchant tactics leading to the allega-
tions can shed light on truly deceitful practices that can affect consumers.86 
For example, an allegation of deceit over a half full box of candy seems facially 
frivolous. Consumers likely wonder why they should care about minor consumer 
complaints when there are more pressing concerns to society. However, the mer-
chant tactics underlying the allegations certainly raise concerns. A 1963 Congres-
sional Record highlights a number of these concerns in a historical context.87 It is 
evident that congress has historically sought to protect consumers from corporate 
deceit through the use of statutes as a “shield.”88 These statutes are considered a 
shield because they protect innocent consumers from deceitful merchants.89 Con-
sumers want to know what they are buying. They want the packaging representing 
the product to be truthful and accurate.90  The half-box of candy lawsuit brought 
attention to the controversial merchant practice of under-packaging, otherwise 
known as “slack-filling.”91 It makes sense that a corporation seeking to increase 
profits would do so by simply decreasing the amount of product quantity per 
 
 79. See generally Kirsten B. Mitchell & Susan Burgess, Disappearing Dockets, REPORTERS 
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, (2006), https://www.rcfp.org/journals/the-news-media-and-
the-law-winter-2006/disappearing-dockets/ (explaining that some lawsuits and prosecutions appear off 
the record or sometimes sealed to the point one would not know they exist). 
 80. See David, supra note 62. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Exaggerated headline shock, 4 Nature Microbiology 377, 377 (2019), https://www.na-
ture.com/articles/s41564-019-0408-7.pdf. 
 83. See Copland, supra note 3. 
 84. Jay Feinman, Five myths about lawsuits, WASH. POST (July 23, 2020 9:05 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-about-law-
suits/2020/07/23/8006d532-c169-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.html. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally Schwartz, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining how some business sometimes engage in 
deceitful practices). 
 87. See Hart, supra note 4. 
 88. Id. at 12349-50. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See generally What is Slack Fill?, WINSTON & STRAWN, https://www.winston.com/en/legal-glos-
sary/slack-fill.html (last visited April 18, 2021) (explaining what slack fill is and how laws attempt to 
regulate it). 
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package over time.92 In conjunction, a business may increase or modify the pack-
aging to appear as though the quantity of product has not changed or possibly even 
increased. Such actions could be deemed a deceitful practice because the intent un-
derlying the actions is to create appearances that are not true, 93 and the practice 
leads to consumers feeling cheated or deceived.94 Under the new Missouri consumer 
protection scheme, the merchant in this example would be able to point the finger 
at the consumer and blame them for being deceived.95 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISSOURI MERCHANDISING 
PRACTICES ACT 
In 1967, Missouri enacted its consumer protection statute, the Merchandising 
Practices Act.96 Before this enactment, Missouri, like many states, suffered from 
the pitfalls of common law fraud. Inadequate damages coupled with a high burden 
of proof meant many claims were not worth bringing.97 The original 1967 Merchan-
dising Practices Act was fourteen sections, and was a broad prohibition constricting 
business acts: 
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pre-
tense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppression, or omis-
sion of any material fact with intent that others rely on such concealment, suppres-
sion or omission in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise, 
is declared to be an unlawful practice.98 
The 1967 enactment was limited to the Attorney General filing actions on be-
half of consumers.99 The Attorney General was empowered to file injunctions, seek 
restitution, and recover attorney’s fees.100 In 1973, consumers were granted a pri-
vate right of action.101 The 1973 amendment granted consumers the ability to bring 
a class action, sue for punitive damages, and even recover attorney’s fees.102 In 
1985, the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act was further amended.103 The most 
significant aspect of the 1985 amendment is that consumers can now bring suit 
against out-of-state businesses conducting commerce in the state of Missouri.104 
Additionally, on top of litigation costs, opposing attorney’s fees, and punitive dam-
ages, businesses are now faced with a new threat of punishment: felony charges for 
willful violation of the 1985 Merchandising Practices Act.105 The deterrent effect 
 
 92. See Pierre Chandon, Research: Customers Notice When Products Shrink More than When They 
Get Bigger, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (March 7, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/research-customers-
notice-when-products-shrink-more-than-when-they-get-bigger. 
 93. Id.; Cynthia Owens, Supersizing and downsizing: the impact of changing packaging and portion 
sizes on food consumption, INSEAD KNOWLEDGE (Sep. 28, 2008), https://knowledge.insead.edu/busi-
ness-finance/marketing/the-impact-of-changing-packaging-and-portion-sizes-1884. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See infra note 123. 
 96. Shepard, supra note 14, at 9. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id at 10. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 407.020 (2020). 
 104. Shepard, supra note 14, at 11. 
 105. Id. 
8
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 5 [], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol5/iss1/9
No. 1] Adamson: The New MMPA Standard 89 
of these  remedies  was enhanced as class action punitive damage awards proved an 
attractive incentive for plaintiff’s attorneys.106 
The 1985 amendment signified a dramatic change for consumers and attorneys 
in Missouri.107 The amendment has been cited as the point at which “the scales 
tipped,” and consumers were “excessively encouraged” to seek litigation.108 There 
are several reasons for this.109 Plaintiffs did not have to show reasonableness nor 
reliance when they brought an action.110 A reasonableness inquiry into the plain-
tiff’s suit would require the plaintiff to demonstrate they acted reasonably under the 
circumstances which lead to the litigation.111 The surge in litigation is also attributed 
to the fact that the 1985 amendment did not have a reliance requirement,112 which 
would require that the consumer actually relied on the representation.113 A plaintiff 
must have actually fallen for the deceit before bringing an action.114 Essentially, the 
lack of a reliance requirement in the 1985 amendment meant consumers could be 
proactive in bringing suits against deceitful business actors.115 Consumers were able 
to craft consumer protections through the courts,116 and doctrines evolved from con-
cepts of caveat emptor to those of encouraging businesses to act in accordance with 
the expectations of modern consumers.117 
The newest addition to the MMPA came in 2020. The new MMPA makes it 
more difficult to certify class members and makes it more difficult to recover all 
attorney’s fees expended on the action.118 Before the new amendment, a plaintiff 
bringing an action under the MMPA was required to show they: (1) purchased mer-
chandise or services from the defendants; (2) for personal, family, or household 
purposes; and (3) suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property; (4) as a result 
of an act declared unlawful under the MMPA.119 The newest amendment requires 
additional showings of: (1) reasonableness in “light of all circumstances”; (2) actual 
reliance; and (3) proof of actual ascertainable damages.120 Plaintiffs must also now 
seek a leave of court to file for punitive damages and meet a higher standard for 
those punitive damages.121 
 
 106. Id at 12. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id at 18. 
 110. Id at 12. 
 111. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investiga-
tive, Law Enforcement, and rulemaking Authority, (Oct. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority [hereinafter Brief Overview of the FTC]. 
 112. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 11. 
 113. See Brief Overview of the FTC, supra note 110. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 11. 
 116. See Schoenlein v. Routt Homes, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 852 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008); Raster v. Ameristar 
Casinos, Inc., 280 S.W.3d 120 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) 
 117. See infra note 151. 
 118. See Shepard, supra note 14, at 19. 
 119. Edmonds v. Hough, 344 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). 
 120. See Missouri Aims to Weed out Meritless Punitive Damage Claims and Reign in Consumer Pro-
tection Claims, LATHROP GPM (May 22, 2020), https://www.lathropgpm.com/newsletter-72561.html. 
 121. Id. 
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III. NEW AMENDMENT & NEW EFFECTS – IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CONSUMERS 
The 2020 amendment set forth modifications and requirements to the old Mis-
souri Merchandising Practices Act standard.122 The first requirement this article will 
address is the reasonableness standard. This article will then discuss the new proof 
of damages requirement. Finally, the article will address punitive damages under 
the MMPA. Throughout each of these requirements, this article will also discuss 
the implications businesses and consumers can expect as a result of the amendment. 
The new MMPA includes a reasonableness requirement.123 A plaintiff now 
needs to show that, as a consumer, they acted reasonably under the circumstances 
in their reliance during the transaction.124 This requirement is a plain attempt to 
thwart frivolous litigation.125 Essentially, even if a practice is unfair or fraudulent 
under the MMPA, it does not matter unless a reasonable consumer could show they 
were victimized by the unfair or fraudulent activity.126 Unfortunately, this height-
ened requirement specifically affects the most vulnerable Missouri consumers,127 
including the elderly, the uneducated, people with poor mental health, and the trust-
ing or impulsive.128 Consumers who fall into these categories are more likely to fall 
victim to misconception and deceit.129 As a result of the amendment, the merchants 
who employ deceitful conduct, by scamming, lying, or general cheating can escape 
liability by pointing the finger at the deceived consumer.130 A fraudster would only 
need to show that a reasonable consumer in such a position would not have relied 
on their statements or reasonably construed the statements or actions as being lit-
eral.131 This opens the door for fraudsters to continue doing what they do best, com-
mit fraud, all while placing the blame on the consumer for believing what they are 
told.132 
The next issue presented by the new MMPA is heightened proof of damages.133 
Consumers must now establish sufficient, definitive, and objective evidence which 
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allows damages to be calculated with a reasonable degree of certainty,134 which 
ideally would produce a fair estimation of the consumer’s harm.135 The effect of 
this provision is to reduce frivolous suits.136 Proving the value of a consumers’ ex-
pectation versus what they receive, however, is difficult. 
Above, the article discusses a “box of candy” lawsuit and how it seems, on its 
face, to be a frivolous suit.137 One can look at consumers who fell for the “slack-
filled” candy box and question what damages they could have suffered.138 It is easy 
to downplay the significance of an insufficiently filled candy box, but this is a prac-
tice that extends to many realms of consumer transactions. It is common practice to 
purposefully deceive and convince millions of consumers to act according to im-
pulse based on what they see.139 Consumer psychology is not a new concept and is 
quite evolved.140 It is well established that consumers make purchasing decisions 
quickly.141 In as little as one-third of a second, a consumer will decide what to buy 
based on what is advertised to them.142 There is a fine line between what we as 
consumers are shown, and what really lies behind the packaging. Clearly, we as 
consumers want companies to be truthful with the products they advertise and sell 
to us.143 However, companies employing psychological tactics can make it difficult 
for a consumer to ascertain the truth while making efficient consumption choices.144 
Requiring a consumer to read every letter of fine print is impractical, and it should 
not be the only way a consumer can act reasonably. 
The last major change to the MMPA in the 2020 amendment was an alteration 
to pleading punitive damages.145 It is not only a change that affects the MMPA, but 
all lawsuits filed in Missouri.146 Prior to the amendment, a plaintiff could file for 
punitive damages within their petition.147 Now, plaintiffs must move for leave of 
the court, and make a special request for punitive damages.148 The punitive damages 
pleading standard has been further heightened to punish only those actors demon-
strating a nefarious intent by clear and convincing evidence.149 Before the amend-
ment, a plaintiff needed to show punitive damages were appropriate by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the typical standard for civil cases.150 Further, before the 
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amendment, a plaintiff only needed to show recklessness on behalf of the merchant 
to qualify for punitive damages.151 Now, a plaintiff must show the defendant inten-
tionally harmed the plaintiff or did so with a “deliberate and flagrant disregard” for 
the safety of others.152 
Punitive damages play a significant role in the judicial system.153 As compen-
sating an aggrieved party for economic harm is difficult to conceptualize, punitive 
damages play an important role in punishing bad actors for offensive conduct while 
still providing some form of relief to the injured party.154 Punitive damages also 
deter similar action by others.155 
While consumers may be offended that merchants use human psychology to 
manipulate them into making choices based on unconscious factors, it is difficult to 
value their harm when they receive less than expected in a transaction. This is where 
punitive damages play a special role. Punitive damages allow for some economic 
reprieve when the compensatory damages are zero or difficult to value.156 The pur-
poses of punitive damages can be analogized to the foundational reasoning behind 
consumer protection acts: protecting aggrieved consumers from malicious and de-
ceitful acts of merchants.157 Like punitive damages, they were introduced because 
the damages stemming from common law were often inadequate to make a lawsuit 
worthwhile.158 
A. New MMPA v. Old MMPA: It’s A Match! 
Improvements to law can be followed by setbacks. This section is dedicated to 
the foundational concepts of common law fraud and state consumer protection in 
comparison with the most recent MMPA amendment. 
Common law fraud rested on notions of caveat emptor, or “let the buyer be-
ware.”159 As the concept evolved, courts sought to restrict merchants who were un-
fair in dealings with consumers. 160 The common law was not without deficiencies. 
Consumers could not bring suit until they had suffered damages. 161 This effectively 
meant that proactive consumers could not prevent merchants from harming less so-
phisticated consumers.162 Additionally, inadequate damages coupled with the fact 
that merchant deception was “notoriously difficult and expensive to prove” during 
a time of increasing merchant sophistication meant aggrieved consumers suffered 
harms without reprieve.163 
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State consumer protections developed to address the inadequacies of common 
law fraud,164 providing an efficient platform for bringing lawsuits.165 Consumers 
could be proactive to keep merchants in check because inadequate damages no 
longer dissuaded consumers.166 If consumers were confident that a merchant was 
acting in violation of consumer protections, they could confidently bring suit and 
expect it to thwart bad merchants.167 
In 1963, legislators recognized a need for packaging that “fairly represents the 
product inside.”168 Even then, new marketing methods were being “spawned daily” 
that made consumers “increasingly vulnerable” due to “an army of motivational 
researchers and promotion specialists… prepared to [deliver] misleading infor-
mation and clever deceptions.”169 It was apparent in 1963 that “boxes partly filled 
with air, and odd-shaped containers holding less than they appear to” was a dishon-
est and undesirable merchandising practice.170 Fears that broad consumer protection 
would lead to frivolous litigation are still present today,171 keeping businesses on 
edge. 172 
The 2020 MMPA amendment is a step back in time to common law fraud and 
fails to adequately protect consumers from merchants. Consumers and legislators 
alike are fearful of deceitful tactics used by merchants.173 Despite these concerns, 
the 2020 MMPA amendment represents a step toward removing the “shield” that 
consumers have used for the last quarter century.174 The most vulnerable consum-
ers, including the elderly and unsophisticated, are now being exposed to the same 
psychological games that have been employed by merchants for decades.175 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No longer can Missouri consumers be proactive in their pursuit of merchant 
honesty. Instead, we have reverted to the same issues faced by common law fraud. 
Before bringing suit, a consumer must be “reasonably and ascertainably” damaged, 
after having “reasonably” depended on what a merchant purported to sell. Today’s 
Missouri consumer needs to be more cautious than ever. If a consumer is deceived, 
they cannot reasonably expect their litigation to be a worthwhile venture. Today’s 
Missouri consumers will continue to suffer from the deceitful practices employed 
by sophisticated merchants until legislation is amended. Vladimir Lenin once said, 
“It is necessary sometimes to take one step backward to take two steps forward.” 
One can only hope this significant step backward will reveal the effects that stem 
from inadequate consumer protection, and, in turn, lead to legislation which furthers 
both the interests of the unsophisticated consumer and honest businesses. 
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